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The Jester and the Sage:
Twain and Nietzsche
G A B R I E L  N O A H  B R A H M  and
F O R R E S T  G .  R O B I N S O N
¬n early July 1906 Mark Twain’s
secretary, Isabel Lyon, was advised by
a friend to read Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra
(1883–85). A week later, on 13 July, Lyon exclaimed in her di-
ary, “‘Zarathustra’ has arrived!” She was immediately taken
with the book. “Here I am,” she reported the next day, “reading
‘Thus spoke Zarathustra’ and I do not pretend to be qualified
to say how wonderful I find it.” Her enthusiasm seems to have
spread throughout the household. A month later, on 8 August,
Lyon records: “the King [her nickname for Mark Twain]
wanted to see my Zarathustra. It pained me to give him up, but
I did it. And after the King had looked through it he said, ‘Oh
damn Nietzsche! He couldn’t write a lucid sentence to save his
soul.’” Lyon goes on, “Somehow I am glad he doesn’t like
Zarathustra. Very, very glad—but I shall be able to quote some
passages to him—some telling passages—for Nietzsche is too
much like himself.”1
Twain’s initial response to Nietzsche, it seems clear, was like
Sigmund Freud’s: a retreat from familiarity prompted by the
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glimpse of a spirit “too much like himself” for comfort.2 A kin-
dred ambivalence surfaced two days later, as Lyon records in
her diary: “The King says, ‘Damn Nietzsche’ when I offer a
quotation for the King’s approval. First he damns—but then he
approves with his head on one side in his quaint listening atti-
tude.” Lyon continued for several months to plumb the depth
of the analogy between the two writers, and by early autumn
fell to praising her employer for his defiance of the “criminal”
Christian God, “the one who made man so that he has to sin
and can’t help himself.” “Like Nietzsche,” she continues,
Twain’s “cry was not one of weak pity for the human, but of
fierce condemnation for the creator of the devils that war
within the human breast.”3 Nor, quite evidently—and quite
despite his gruff dismissals—was the humorist unmindful of his
kinship with the infamous German. In an autobiographical dic-
tation on 4 September 1907 Twain declares that he has not
read Nietzsche, but he acknowledges at the same time a certain
familiarity and sympathy with the German’s ideas: “Nietzsche
published his book and was at once pronounced crazy by the
world—by a world which included tens of thousands of bright,
sane men who believed exactly as Nietzsche believed but con-
cealed the fact and scoffed at Nietzsche.”4
While it is perfectly clear that Mark Twain was aware of
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, there is no evidence that he more than
glanced at the book or that its author was a direct influence in
any of his writings. Twain’s philosophical ideas had pretty much
jelled by the time Isabel Lyon brought Nietzsche to his atten-
tion. Her acute perception of a likeness between the two writ-
ers was undoubtedly triggered by her familiarity with What Is
Man?, the Socratic dialogue and “Gospel of Self” that Twain
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2 In 1931 Freud wrote: “I have rejected the study of Nietzsche although—no, be-
cause—it was plain that I would find insights in him very similar to psychoanalytic ones”
(Sigmund Freud, letter to Lothar Bickel, 28 June 1931, quoted in Peter Gay, Freud: A
Life for Our Time [New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1988], p. 46n [Gay’s translation]).
3 Isabel Lyon, Diary, 10 August and 12 October 1906. Mark Twain Papers. On 27
August Lyon reports: “This morning I said to the King, ‘Nietzsche says—’ ‘Oh, damn
Nietzsche’. ‘But Mr. Clemens, Nietzsche calls the acts of God, “divine kicks.”’ ‘Hurrah
for Nietzsche!’ the King shouted, and slapped his leg hard.”
4 Mark Twain, autobiographical dictation, 4 September 1907. Mark Twain Papers.
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was preparing for publication in the spring of 1906. What Is
Man? gives voice to ideas that had been smoldering for
decades, and that Twain felt compelled to write down and pre-
serve for posterity. But because the book was relentless in its ex-
posure of human selfishness, he elected to issue it in a small
and anonymous edition for private circulation. Isabel Lyon,
who helped with the proofreading, was an enthusiastic admirer
of the subversive sentiments on display in What Is Man?. It is “so
absorbingly interesting,” she wrote in her diary, “that once you
begin a galley, you can’t stop until you’ve read all the batch.
And Mr. Clemens does like it so much! It is his pet book.” 5 It is
a reasonable surmise, then, that Lyon’s enthusiasm for Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, which she received just a few weeks later, was
fueled by its perceived intellectual kinship with her employer’s
defiant little tract.
Others have followed Lyon in glimpsing an affinity be-
tween Twain and Nietzsche. Carl Dolmetsch finds no evidence
of direct influence, but observes nonetheless that Nietzsche’s
ideas were “commonplaces” of the “European intellectual mi-
lieu” that Twain entered during his 1897–99 residence in Vi-
enna, when he first set to work on What Is Man?.6 Jennifer L. Zac-
cara is equally measured in what she describes as Twain’s
“acceptance of a Nietzschean worldview.” It is a virtual certainty,
she argues, that the American would have become aware of
Nietzsche’s nihilism during his stay in Vienna. She is quick to
add, however: “It is fair to say Mark Twain came to a nihilistic
vision on his own, . . . and that he nurtured this dark view of the
world over the years” before the Austrian sojourn.7 We concur
entirely with Zaccara that Twain’s intellectual debt to Nietzsche
was small, involving little more than confirmation of an endur-
ing trend. At the same time, however, we have found that the
similarities between the thought of the two writers are closer
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5 Isabel Lyon, Diary, 24 May 1906. Mark Twain Papers.
6 See Dolmetsch, “Our Famous Guest”: Mark Twain in Vienna (Athens: Univ. of Geor-
gia Press, 1992), p. 228.
7 Jennifer L. Zaccara, “Mark Twain, Isabel Lyon, and the ‘Talking Cure’: Negotiat-
ing Nostalgia and Nihilism in the Autobiography,” in Constructing Mark Twain: New Direc-
tions in Scholarship, ed. Laura E. Skandera Trombley and Michael J. Kiskis (Columbia:
Univ. of Missouri Press, 2001), pp. 120, 115.
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and much more numerous than scholars have recognized. The
link that Isabel Lyon glimpsed in 1906, and that Dolmetsch
and Zaccara briefly elaborate, is one matching element among
many others in the separate but parallel ideas of Nietzsche and
Twain on the human condition. Indeed, we suspect that had
the two writers met and compared views, they would have expe-
rienced a stunning shock of recognition.8
Though scholars have assigned Nietzsche’s work to philos-
ophy and Mark Twain’s to literature, both writers were brilliant
psychologists with a common and compelling interest in the
submerged wellsprings of human behavior. Both were maver-
ick moralists given to immoralist masquerades. Both shared
Freud’s interest in the unconscious, his inclination to trace
modern discontent to the tyranny of suppressed or unacknowl-
edged psychic phenomena, and his generally dark prognosis
for civilization at the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed,
both were at times disposed to view the world as a madhouse.
“The earth,” Nietzsche exclaims in The Genealogy of Morals
(1887), “has been a lunatic asylum for too long.”9 Twain’s Satan
takes the same view, writing back to Hell of the earth: “This is a
strange place, an extraordinary place, and interesting. There is
nothing resembling it at home. The people are all insane.” 10
But even as they condemned the modern world, both writers
tended to exempt humans from responsibility for their condi-
tion. The belief in free will, they agreed, was as groundless as
the unseen engines of behavior were real. Nietzsche was per-
suaded of what he described as “man’s complete lack of respon-
sibility for his behavior and for his nature,”11 while Twain never
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8 Nietzsche was also well aware of Mark Twain. For example, in 1879 he offered to
send his friend Franz Overbeck a copy of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876). See
Friedrich Nietzsche, letter to Franz Overbeck, 14 November 1879, quoted in The
Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954, 1968), p. 73.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals: An Attack, in his The Birth of Tragedy
and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., 1956), p. 227.
10 Mark Twain, “Letters from the Earth” (1909), rpt. in his What Is Man? and Other
Philosophical Writings, ed. Paul Baender, vol. 19 of The Works of Mark Twain (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1973), p. 405.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (1878), I, 107; quoted and trans. 
in Philippa Foot, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on
Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals,” ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ.
of California Press, 1994), p. 10.
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wearied of blaming God or temperament or circumstance for
human degradation. “Why do you reproach yourself ?” asks
Mark Twain’s Satan in No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger (1916);
“You did not make yourself; how then are you to blame?”12 The
writers were alike, then, in mingling contempt for humans with
a belief in their essential innocence.
The madness of the world was most broadly manifest for
Nietzsche and Twain in hegemonic Christian civilization. “I can
think of no development that has had a more pernicious effect
upon the health of the race,” the German declares, than the
Christian ascetic ideal; “It may be called, without exaggeration,
the supreme disaster in the history of European man’s health”
(Genealogy of Morals, p. 280). For his part, Mark Twain took the
view that there had never been “a stupider religion” than Chris-
tianity;13 that in time “it will be recognised that all the compe-
tent killers are Christian”;14 and that modern Christendom
might best be imagined as “a majestic matron, in flowing robes
drenched with blood. On her head, a golden crown of thorns;
impaled on its spines, the bleeding heads of patriots who died
for their countries—Boers, Boxers, Filipinos; . . . Protruding
from [her] pocket, [a] bottle labeled ‘We bring you the Bless-
ings of Civilization.’ Necklace—handcuffs and a burglar’s
jimmy.”15 Though his indictment was broader than Nietzsche’s,
Twain certainly shared the philosopher’s view that Christian
civilization was most lethal in its infliction of psychological suf-
fering on individual believers. He returned to this point on 
numerous occasions, but nowhere more memorably than in
No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger, where Satan inveighs against
a God who could make good children as easily as bad, yet pre-
ferred to make bad ones; who could have made every one of
them happy, yet never made a single happy one; . . . who gave his
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12 Mark Twain, No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger (1916), in Mark Twain’s Mysterious
Stranger Manuscripts, ed. William M. Gibson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of 
California Press, 1969), p. 250.
13 Mark Twain, autobiographical dictation, 22 June 1906. Mark Twain Papers.
14 Mark Twain, “The Chronicle of Young Satan” (written 1897–1900), in Mysterious
Stranger Manuscripts, p. 137.
15 Mark Twain, “The Stupendous Procession” (written 1901), in Mark Twain’s Fables
of Man, ed. John S. Tuckey, Kenneth M. Sanderson, and Bernard L. Stein (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1972), p. 405.
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angels painless lives, yet cursed his other children with biting
miseries and maladies of mind and body; who mouths justice,
and invented hell—mouths mercy, and invented hell—mouths
Golden Rules, and forgiveness multiplied by seventy times seven,
and invented hell; . . . who created man without invitation, then
tries to shuffle the responsibility for man’s acts upon man, in-
stead of honorably placing it where it belongs, upon himself; and
finally, with altogether divine obtuseness, invites this poor
abused slave to worship him!
(No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger, pp. 404–5)
Nietzsche traces the malaise of modernity back to the an-
cient origins of what he describes as “slave morality.” He ex-
plains: “All truly noble morality grows out of triumphant self-
affirmation. Slave ethics, on the other hand, begins by saying no
to an ‘outside,’ an ‘other,’ a non-self, and that no is its creative
act” (Genealogy of Morals, pp. 170 –71). Such ressentiment, closely
linked for Nietzsche with Christianity, arose historically out of
the hatred of the weak for the strong, of the slave for the master.
But because their survival necessitated the repression of the
craving for power and revenge, the weak internalized their ag-
gressive instincts. The result was an intensification of conscious-
ness, and with it the development of a punishing conscience.
Having turned his desire for outward revenge inward upon
himself, the now “guilt-ridden man seized upon religion in or-
der to exacerbate his self-torment to the utmost” (Genealogy of
Morals, p. 226). To the very considerable extent that the slave
morality achieved hegemony in the Christian West, revenge
upon the masters, now themselves humbled and disciplined by
the new dispensation, was achieved. But the victory, earned at
the price of surrender to “the most terrible sickness that has
wasted man thus far,” was of course no victory at all. Driven by
furtive resentment of all that is noble and free, and inwardly
tormented by remorseless guilt, humankind was in thrall to a
parched, punishing regime. Nietzsche protests: “What a mad,
unhappy animal is man!” (Genealogy of Morals, p. 226).16
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16 We are indebted here to Jörg Salaquarda, “Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian
Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M.
Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 90 –118.
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For Nietzsche it is perhaps the most painful irony of all
that humans are innocent of the terrible guilt unleashed upon
them by their proud but utterly groundless morality of good
and evil. In Twilight of the Idols (1889) he declares: “My demand
upon the philosopher is known, that he take his stand beyond
good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath
himself.”17 Where there is no possibility of wrong there can be
no real guilt, only its crippling illusion; Nietzsche insists that
“the bite of conscience, like the bite of a dog into a stone, is a
stupidity.”18 The historical assault on the free outward play of
instinct was for Nietzsche the commencement of all of our
mortal woe. He argues: “Every naturalism in morality—that is,
every healthy morality—is dominated by an instinct of life. . . .
Anti-natural morality—that is, almost every morality which has
so far been taught, revered, and preached—turns, conversely,
against the instincts of life” (Twilight of the Idols, pp. 489–90).
More directly and succinctly still, he claimed that “all that is
good is instinct—and hence easy, necessary, free” (p. 494).
Who that has read Mark Twain’s most famous novel can fail
to be reminded here of Huck’s words at the end of chapter 18,
when he has escaped the murderous, moralizing Christian civi-
lization along the shore and rejoined his friend Jim on the raft
in the middle of the wide Mississippi? “We said there warn’t no
home like a raft, after all. Other places do seem so cramped up
and smothery, but a raft don’t. You feel mighty free and easy
and comfortable on a raft.”19 The fugitive boy’s feelings directly
reflect those of his maker, who enjoyed drifting down great
rivers precisely because of the peace of mind—and most espe-
cially the freedom from nagging guilt—brought on by the
journey. Ten days of rafting on the Rhône in 1891, Twain wrote
to his friend Joseph Twichell, left his “conscience in a state of
coma, and lazy comfort, and solid happiness. In fact there’s
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17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer
(1889), in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 501.
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow (1880), in The Portable Nietzsche,
p. 68.
19 Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884), ed. Victor Fischer and Lin
Salamo, with Walter Blair, vol. 8 of The Works of Mark Twain (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. of California Press, 2003), p. 155.
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nothing that’s so lovely.”20 A kindred sentiment surfaces to view
in the title of Twain’s unpublished manuscript The Innocents
Adrift, a section of which was posthumously published in 1923
in Europe and Elsewhere. “To glide down the stream in an open
boat, moved by the current only,” and thereby to experience a
“strange absence of the sense of sin, and the stranger absence
of the desire to commit it,”21 was for Mark Twain the height of
attainable mortal bliss.
But of course neither the writer nor his most famous pro-
tagonist were able to avoid the shore and the inevitable anguish
awaiting them there. Huck’s subsequent “adventures” present
constant and baffling challenges to his sense of right and
wrong. At one crucial juncture, when his instinctive loyalty to
Jim draws him into conflict with conventional values, Huck
rounds toward a Nietzschean perspective on morality: “Well,
then, says I, what’s the use you learning to do right, when it’s
troublesome to do right and ain’t no trouble to do wrong, and
the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn’t answer that. So
I reckoned I wouldn’t bother no more about it, but after this al-
ways do whichever come handiest at the time” (Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, p. 127). Despite his bold resolve, Huck under-
estimates the subtle and tenacious authority of the moral
scheme in which he is entangled. In time, however, when com-
plete disenchantment finally sets in, he decides to sever all ties
with Christian civilization: “I reckon I got to light out for the
Territory ahead of the rest,” he reflects, “because aunt Sally
she’s going to adopt me and sivilize me and I can’t stand it. I
been there before” (Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, p. 362).
Mark Twain and Huck are closely akin to Nietzsche in their
approval of instinct, of all that is easy, natural, and free, and in
their corresponding impatience with Christian civilization and
its irrational tyranny of conscience. During his long, varied, and
often tumultuous life, guilt was the humorist’s special curse.
“The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime in Con-
necticut” (1876), in which Twain claims to have murdered his
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20 Mark Twain, letter to Joseph H. Twichell, 1 October 1891, in Mark Twain’s Letters,
ed. Albert Bigelow Paine, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1917), II, 558.
21 Mark Twain, “Down the Rhône” (1891), in his Europe and Elsewhere (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1923), pp. 129, 139.
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odious conscience, makes comedy of what was in fact a perma-
nent blight on his spirit. Albert Bigelow Paine observes: “Re-
morse was always [his] surest punishment. To his last days on
earth he never outgrew its pangs.”22 The moral burden was com-
pounded by Twain’s perverse habit of blaming himself on occa-
sions when others were the victims of suffering for which he had
no direct responsibility. Years after her father’s death, Clara
Clemens paused to comment on this dominant strain in his
makeup. She observed: “If on any occasion he could manage to
trace the cause of some one’s mishap to something he himself
had done or said, no one could persuade him he was mistaken.
Self-condemnation was the natural turn for his mind to take, yet
often he accused himself of having inflicted pain or trouble
when the true cause was far removed from himself.”23 Twain’s
moral anguish takes clear if oblique expression in A Connecticut
Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), where Hank Morgan muses:
“If I had the remaking of man, he wouldn’t have any conscience.
It is one of the most disagreeable things connected with a per-
son; and although it certainly does do a great deal of good, it
cannot be said to pay, in the long run; it would be much better to
have less good and more comfort.”24
Like Nietzsche, Mark Twain was increasingly persuaded of
both the groundlessness and the destructiveness of the conven-
tional Christian distinction between good and evil. During the
last decade or so of his life, Twain’s views coalesced in a bitter
attack on what he called “the Moral Sense.” Satan, the “hero” of
Twain’s Mysterious Stranger writings, speaks quite clearly and 
directly for Twain in excoriating humanity as a
“paltry race—always lying, always claiming virtues which it hasn’t
got. . . . Inspired by that mongrel Moral Sense of his! A Sense
whose function is to distinguish between right and wrong, with
liberty to choose which of them he will do. Now what advantage
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22 Albert Bigelow Paine, Mark Twain, a Biography: The Personal and Literary Life of
Samuel Langhorne Clemens, 3 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1912), I, 65.
23 Clara Clemens, My Father, Mark Twain (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931),
pp. 6 –7.
24 Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, ed. Bernard L. Stein, vol. 9
of The Works of Mark Twain (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1979),
pp. 209–10.
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can he get out of that? He is always choosing, and in nine cases
out of ten he prefers the wrong. There shouldn’t be any wrong;
and without the Moral Sense there couldn’t be any. And yet he is
such an unreasonable creature that he is not able to perceive
that the Moral Sense degrades him to the bottom layer of ani-
mated beings and is a shameful possession.”
(“Chronicle of Young Satan,” pp. 72–73)25
Here, then, is Mark Twain’s version of Nietzsche’s slave moral-
ity. The distinction between good and evil is without founda-
tion, and those who proudly make choices based upon it are
the contemptible victims of a delusion that enslaves them to
the darkness in themselves and to the tyranny of conscience.
True, Mark Twain set forth no genealogy of moral decline from
past freedom to present bondage; rather, he was inclined to
characterize human nature as unchanging in its perverse tilt
toward iniquity. Hopelessly alienated from the blissful freedom
of their instinctive lives, humans surrender all too readily to the
destructive allure of the Moral Sense. “‘Civilization is Repres-
sion,’” Miss Lyon protested to her diary in 1905, reporting on a
conversation with her famous employer; “you have to jam down
out of sight the action of the strongest laws of your being and
the great cry of truth.”26 Nietzsche, the passionate advocate of
what he regarded as a natural, healthy morality that was firmly
grounded in the instinct of life, could hardly have disagreed.
Indeed, he would have gone further still, to insist that “man,
with his need for self-torture, . . . invented bad conscience in
order to hurt himself” (Genealogy of Morals, pp. 225–26). Twain
advances the identical view in “The Facts Concerning the Re-
cent Carnival of Crime in Connecticut,” where his sadistic con-
science declares: “It is my business—and my joy—to make you
repent of everything you do.”27
Nietzsche and Twain were also at one in the belief that
contemporary Christian civilization, ensnared in an unnatural
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25 See also Mark Twain, “Man’s Place in the Animal World” (1896), in What Is Man?
p. 86: “Since the Moral Sense has but the one office, the one capacity—to enable man
to do wrong—it is plainly without value to him.”
26 Isabel Lyon, Diary, 23 September 1905. Mark Twain Papers.
27 Mark Twain, “The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime in Connecti-
cut,” in his Collected Tales, Sketches, Speeches, and Essays, 1852–1890, ed. Louis J. Budd
(New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1992), p. 654.
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morality enforced by predatory conscience, required for its
creation and maintenance a culture based on fear and im-
mersed in lies. Again, Twain’s analysis is comparatively scat-
tered and unsystematic, giving scant attention, for example, to
Nietzsche’s pivotal notion of ressentiment. But the writers were
nonetheless in agreement on key essentials. In 1880 Nietzsche
noted: “The refinement of morality increases together with the
refinement of fear. Today the fear of disagreeable feelings in
other people is almost the strongest of our own disagreeable
feelings.”28 Mark Twain was equally impressed both with the
human craving for self-approval and with the resulting fear of
disapproval from others, which in combination form a virtu-
ally irresistible drive toward conformity. Such is the unequivo-
cal message of much of Twain’s late writing, most directly ex-
pressed perhaps in “Corn-Pone Opinions” (1901), which takes
as its text the sage declaration of a young slave: “You tell me
whar a man gits his corn-pone, en I’ll tell you what his ’pinions
is.” Twain observes: “Broadly speaking, there are none but
corn-pone opinions. And broadly speaking, Corn-Pone stands
for Self-Approval. Self-approval is acquired mainly from the
approval of other people. The result is Conformity.” 29
But of course, conformity to a slave morality could be
achieved only at the price of widespread individual and collec-
tive surrender to varieties of evasion, disavowal, deceit, and
self-deception—to a culture, in short, of lies. Nietzsche’s “con-
tempt for evasive falsification,” observes Philippa Foot, was
“one of the strongest things in him” (“Nietzsche’s Immoral-
ism,” p. 4). Nietzsche’s feelings found their focus in the devious
dynamics of ressentiment, the “art of simulation” that “reaches its
peak” in the bitter struggle of the slave majority against the no-
ble master class:
here deception, flattery, lying and cheating, talking behind the
back, posing, living in borrowed splendor, being masked, the dis-
guise of convention, acting a role before others and before one-
self—in short, the constant fluttering around the single flame of
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28 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Notes (1880 –81),” in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 75.
29 Mark Twain, “Corn-Pone Opinions,” in his Collected Tales, Sketches, Speeches, and
Essays, 1891–1910, ed. Louis J. Budd (New York: Literary Classics of the United States,
1992), pp. 507, 510.
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vanity is so much the rule and the law that almost nothing is
more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure urge for
truth could make its appearance among men.30
In a civilization given over almost entirely to slavish ressentiment,
Nietzsche bitterly complained, “to be truthful means using the
customary metaphors—in moral terms: the obligation to lie
according to a fixed convention, to lie herd-like in a style oblig-
atory for all” (“On Truth and Lie,” p. 47).
Mark Twain took a strikingly similar view of both the vast
domain and cultural dynamics of deception. Indeed, we cannot
too much emphasize the importance of the lie in the work of
both writers, who perhaps shared nothing so much as the sense
that humankind is in permanent retreat from a true reckoning
with its own reality. In one of the maxims from Pudd’nhead 
Wilson’s New Calendar, which Twain uses as chapter epigraphs
for his Following the Equator (1897), he writes: “There are those
who scoff at the schoolboy, calling him frivolous and shallow.
Yet it was the schoolboy who said ‘Faith is believing what you
know ain’t so.’”31 In the same vein, Nietzsche observes: “‘Faith’
means not wanting to know what is true.”32 In the view of
Twain’s Satan, the human “race lived a life of continuous 
and uninterrupted self-deception” (“Chronicle of Young Satan,”
p. 164).
In Twain’s work more generally, as in Nietzsche’s, pervasive
deceit is invariably bound up with moral evasion. As illustration
we need look no further than Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The
Tragedy of Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894), “The Man That Corrupted
Hadleyburg” (1900), and No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger. But
Twain is most direct and emphatic on this issue in two essays de-
voted specifically to the subject of lying. In the first, “On the De-
cay of the Art of Lying,” which he presented at a club in Hart-
ford in 1882, he ruminates briefly and archly on the axiom:
“Lying is universal—we all do it; we all must do it. Therefore,
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30 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (written
1873), in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 43.
31 Mark Twain, Following the Equator: A Journey around the World (1897), rpt. in Follow-
ing the Equator and Anti-imperialist Essays (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), p. 132.
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist (1895), in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 635.
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the wise thing is for us diligently to train ourselves to lie
thoughtfully, judiciously.”33 In “My First Lie and How I Got Out
of It,” published nearly twenty years later in 1899, his tone is
much more sober and deliberate. Once again, Twain states un-
equivocally that “all people are liars from the cradle onward,
without exception.” Deceitfulness is the very essence of human
nature, and it is so by virtue of an “eternal law.” Since man
“didn’t invent the law,” he is not responsible for its effects; “it is
merely his business to obey it and keep still.” This act of con-
cealment, this master lie about the universal sway of deceitful-
ness, he goes on, is “the lie of silent assertion; we can tell it with-
out saying a word, and we all do it.”34
The silent acquiescence in known deceit is integral to what
we have elsewhere defined as “bad faith,” the reciprocal decep-
tion of self and other in the denial of departures from leading
public values.35 Bad faith as it appears in Twain’s work bears the
clear implication that humans will sometimes permit what they
cannot approve so long as their complicity is submerged in a
larger, tacit consensus. For Nietzsche a person in thrall to ressen-
timent “is neither truthful nor ingenuous nor honest and forth-
right with himself” (Genealogy of Morals, p. 172). Such a person
will cling to Christian faith, which for the philosopher involves
“having no choice but to lie” (The Antichrist, p. 635). For Nietzsche
the lie involves “wishing not to see something that one does see;
wishing not to see something as one sees it. . . . The most com-
mon lie is that with which one lies to oneself” (The Antichrist,
p. 640). In similar fashion, Mark Twain views epidemic self-
deception as a leading symptom of the disease of modern
Christian civilization. In “My First Lie and How I Got Out of It”
he observes of the “lie of silent assertion”: “In the magnitude of
its territorial spread it is one of the most majestic lies that the
civilizations make it their sacred and anxious care to guard and
watch and propagate.” The silence in fact speaks volumes about
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the ubiquitous influence of the Moral Sense, the perverse
human gravitation to evil, and the subsequent bad-faith denial
of complicity in gross injustice. Twain continues:
It would not be possible for a humane and intelligent person to
invent a rational excuse for slavery; yet you will remember that in
the early days of the emancipation agitation in the North the ag-
itators got but small help or countenance from any one. Argue
and plead and pray as they might, they could not break the uni-
versal stillness that reigned, from pulpit and press all the way
down to the bottom of society—the clammy stillness created and
maintained by the lie of silent assertion—the silent assertion
that there wasn’t anything going on in which humane and intelli-
gent people were interested. (“My First Lie,” p. 440)
We are witness to a species of the same mute moral evasiveness,
Twain adds, in the response to the Dreyfus case in France and
in the refusal among many in England to acknowledge the in-
justice of the Boer War (1899–1902) in South Africa. He con-
cludes: “The silent colossal National Lie . . . is the support and
confederate of all the tyrannies and shams and inequalities and
unfairnesses that afflict the peoples” of the world (“My First
Lie,” p. 446).
Nietzsche and Twain are thus at one on many important is-
sues. They agree on the madness of modern Christian civiliza-
tion; they agree as well that the disease has its wellspring in the
displacement of healthy human instinct by a groundless and
pathological moral culture of good and evil—a culture feeding
on fear, fostering massive and oppressive guilt, and dependent
for its maintenance on the proliferation of lies. To be sure,
their ideas on these matters do not overlap in all details. As we
shall see, Twain knew something of ressentiment, but it was not as
central or as developed in his thinking as it was in Nietzsche’s.
And though both writers emphasize the role of lies in modern
life, Nietzsche highlights the self-deception requisite to faith in
the dominant moral system itself, while Twain is equally atten-
tive to bad-faith evasions of the injustices suffered by the vic-
tims of civilization. Despite these differences, however, the par-
allels in the thought of these maverick contemporaries are
numerous and remarkably close.
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We have not yet exhausted the fertile ground for compari-
son of Nietzsche and Twain. The striking intersection of ideas
at the core of their analysis of modern civilization forms a kind
of center from which an array of cognate perspectives may be
seen to arise. Because they were sharply attentive to the contra-
dictions in human experience, both writers gravitated to apho-
risms—brief, pithy, paradoxical utterances often featuring
unanticipated turnings and juxtapositions. In The Wanderer and
His Shadow Nietzsche wrote: “The greatest giver of alms is cow-
ardice” (p. 70). And in Thus Spoke Zarathustra he warned: “Be-
ware of the good and the just! They like to crucify those who in-
vent their own virtue for themselves.”36 Similarly, Twain,
through his Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar maxims, declared:
“There are several good protections against temptations, but
the surest is cowardice”; and “The principal difference between
a cat and a lie is that the cat has only nine lives” (Following the
Equator, pp. 324, 622).
Like Nietzsche, Twain was a pioneer of modern prose char-
acterized by abrupt transitions, discontinuity, and fragmenta-
tion. For both, contradiction and paradox, everywhere manifest
in conventional morality, were the inevitable offspring of faith
in a nonexistent God. Hardly immune to contradiction them-
selves, both alternated between contempt for their kind and a
forgiving sense of human innocence. Both regarded the idea of
free will as an illusion;37 both strongly inclined to determinism.38
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Neither put much faith in democracy, established judicial sys-
tems, or the idea of human equality. They agreed on the role of
the unconscious in human motivation and shared a belief in the
analytical significance of dreams.39 Both recognized a potent,
often unintentional autobiographical impulse in their writing.
“Yes,” Twain acknowledged in 1886, “the truth is, my books are
simply autobiographies”;40 Nietzsche described his work as a
“the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary
and unconscious auto-biography.”41 Both yearned after the
imagined bliss of life in earlier, less “civilized” circumstances,
and both acknowledged a powerful craving for oblivion. Neither
believed that most humans would choose to live their lives over
again.42
While it could hardly be argued that our principals were
animated by a sanguine surplus, there are nonetheless several
overlapping strands of optimism in their thought. Both men
prescribed laughter as a cure for the spiritual ailments of the
modern world. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra advises: “Not by wrath
does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of grav-
ity!” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 153). And again: “Laughter I
have pronounced holy; you higher men, learn to laugh!” (Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 407–8). Twain’s Satan offers virtually the
same advice. The human race, he insists, “has unquestionably
one really effective weapon—laughter. Power, Money, Persua-
sion, Supplication, Persecution—these can lift at a colossal
humbug,—push it a little—crowd it a little—weaken it a little,
century by century: but only Laughter can blow it to rags and
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atoms at a blast. Against the assault of Laughter nothing can
stand” (“Chronicle of Young Satan,” pp. 165–66).
The two writers were also at one in affirming that humans
have the potential, little recognized or developed, to create and
to re-create themselves and their world. Nietzsche writes:
“When the Christian crusaders in the East happened upon the
invincible Society of Assassins, . . . they must have got some hint
of the slogan reserved for the highest ranks, which ran, ‘Noth-
ing is true; everything is permitted.’ Here we have real freedom,
for the notion of truth itself has been disposed of” (Genealogy of
Morals, p. 287). During a long, tumultuous career, Twain made
intellectual gestures along similar lines, and may be said to have
embodied the self- and world-creating spirit that Nietzsche cele-
brates. But it was not until the last, often dark years of his life
that the humorist fully articulated his own version of ultimate
human freedom. Once again, Twain spoke through Satan, who
exults: “My mind creates! . . . Creates anything it desires—and in
a moment” (“Chronicle of Young Satan,” p. 114). The doctrine
takes an even more radical turn at the very end of No. 44, The
Mysterious Stranger, where Satan declares: “Nothing exists; all is a
dream. . . . Nothing exists save empty space—and you!” God, good
and evil, the terrible burden of guilt—“these things are all im-
possible,” he insists, “except in a dream.” Satan is careful to
highlight the liberating significance of his message—“I your
poor servant have revealed you to yourself and set you free”—
and adds that the key to contentment in solitary, infinite space
is simply to “Dream other dreams, and better!” (No. 44, The
Mysterious Stranger, pp. 404–5).
Our writers were also strikingly at one in their esteem for
animals, children, and selected warriors and aristocrats, whom
they regarded as exemplary of the honesty and freedom want-
ing in most adults. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra argues: “The cre-
ation of freedom for oneself for new creation—that is within
the power of the lion. The creation of freedom for oneself and
a sacred ‘No’ even to duty—for that, my brothers, the lion is
needed.” But strength for resistance is itself not enough, he
continues, which is why “the preying lion [must] still become a
child.” For “the child is innocence and forgetting, a new begin-
ning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred
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‘Yes’” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 139). Here is humanity freed
from the corrupting accretions of history and civilization, fresh
and joyous in its instinctive embrace of a brave new world.
Robert C. Solomon describes Nietzsche as “a misanthrope who
translated his disgust with humanity as he found it into an in-
spiring portrait of humanity (or superhumanity) as it once was
and again may be.” This idealized figure, Solomon adds, is pos-
sessed of a “master morality” that “is not only good but in some
sense more natural, healthier, and truer to our ideal nature(s)”
than the slave morality that has displaced it.43
Animals and children living outside the dark circle of
good and evil, and therefore free agents of the master morality,
have their direct counterparts for Nietzsche in warriors and
aristocrats equally removed in spirit from modern decadence.
He observes:
Among the noble, mental acuteness always tends slightly to sug-
gest luxury and overrefinement. The fact is that with them it is
much less important than is the perfect functioning of the rul-
ing, unconscious instincts or even a certain temerity to follow
sudden impulses, court danger, or indulge spurts of violent rage,
love, worship, gratitude, or vengeance. . . . It is a sign of strong,
rich temperaments that they cannot for long take seriously their
enemies, their misfortunes, their misdeeds.
(Genealogy of Morals, pp. 172–73)
The master morality flourishes among those whose limited and
undeveloped intellects scarcely influence or impede a natural
impetuosity at once robust and heedless of consequences. Be-
cause “such characters have in them an excess of plastic curative
power, and also a power of oblivion” (Genealogy of Morals, p. 173),
they are free in a mindless sort of way to follow the promptings of
instinct unencumbered by artificial considerations of right and
wrong. Warriors, Nietzsche believed, were supremely gifted with
this highest form of moral and physical health. He boldly de-
clares: “The human being who has become free . . . spits on the
contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers,
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Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats.
The free man is a warrior” (Twilight of the Idols, p. 542).
Mark Twain entertained an array of strikingly similar ideas,
though with him they were characteristically more moderate
and unsystematic. Like Nietzsche, he looked upon the child-
hood of mankind as an age comparable in its blissful freedom
and moral perfection to that enjoyed by animals. In an 1898
draft he declares: “Adam was perfect before he got the Moral
Sense, imperfect as soon as he got it. In the one case he couldn’t
do wrong, in the other he could. Adam fell; the other animals
have not fallen. By the supreme verdict of God they are morally
perfect.”44 It is little wonder, in this light, that Twain looked back
on his own early days with such aching nostalgia. He wrote in
1900 to the widow of his old friend, Will Bowen, that once
childhood had passed, “life is a drudge, & indeed a sham. A
sham, & likewise a failure. . . . I should greatly like to re-live my
youth, & then get drowned. I should like to call back Will
Bowen & John Garth & the others, & live the life, & be as we
were, & make holiday until 15, then all drown together.” 45 It is
little wonder as well that, when they play, Twain’s fictional boys
make violent war and indulge in “orgies,” all with unreflecting,
animal indifference to adult moral consequence.
The aristocrats and warriors that Hank Morgan encoun-
ters in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court are themselves
childlike in the free, impulsive play of their instincts and in
their immunity to guilt. Hank Morgan reflects: “they were a
childlike and innocent lot. . . . It was hard to associate them
with anything cruel or dreadful; and yet they dealt in tales of
blood and suffering with a guileless relish that made me almost
forget to shudder” (A Connecticut Yankee, p. 66). King Arthur is
so completely and unself-consciously the noble warrior that he
is unable to simulate the outward bearing of a slave, even when
his life depends upon it. Hank insists to the king:
“Your soldierly stride, your lordly port—these will not do. You
stand too straight, your looks are too high, too confident. The
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cares of a kingdom do not stoop the shoulders, they do not
droop the chin, they do not depress the high level of the eye-
glance, they do not put doubt and fear in the heart and hang out
the signs of them in slouching body and unsure step. It is the sor-
did cares of the lowly born that do these things.”
(A Connecticut Yankee, p. 320)
The king is admirable in Hank’s eyes (as we must imagine he was
in Twain’s) because his rather dim, unreflecting self-assurance
renders him invulnerable to the oppressive doubts that weigh
on those cursed with more active minds. Hank accords the king
the same respect that Twain’s Satan shows for animals. In “The
Chronicle of Young Satan” Satan angrily rejects the use of the
word “brutal” to describe human cruelty, insisting: “You should
not insult the brutes by such a misuse of that word. . . . No brute
ever does a cruel thing—that is the monopoly of the snob 
with the Moral Sense. When a brute inflicts pain he does it 
innocently. . . . And he does not inflict pain for the pleasure of
inflicting it— only man does that” (“Chronicle of Young 
Satan,” p. 72).
Viewed from this perspective, Twain’s hero-worship of
Ulysses S. Grant and Joan of Arc makes especially good sense.
In Twain’s eyes, the general and the maid were moral paragons
whose childlike innocence was directly linked to their extraor-
dinary military prowess. Both were instinctive warriors whose
valor and stoicism arose unreflectingly from the simple in-
tegrity of their natures. In an 1885 letter Twain observes ad-
miringly: “Grant was no namby-pamby fool, he was a man—all
over—rounded and complete.” But Grant was this way pre-
cisely because he was also an innocent who expressed himself
“with a frankness and a child-like naïvety.”46 Elsewhere in that
same year Twain referred to Grant as “the most simple-hearted
of all men.”47 Like Grant, Joan is for Twain the composite of 
all noble virtue; she is truthful and steadfast and of dauntless
courage. In Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc (1896) Twain
156 nineteenth-century liter ature
46 Mark Twain, letter to Henry Ward Beecher, 11 September 1885, in Mark Twain’s
Letters, II, 460.
47 Mark Twain, “About General Grant’s ‘Memoirs’”(1885), in Mark Twain’s Autobio-
graphy, ed. Albert Bigelow Paine, 2 vols. (New York: P. F. Collier and Son Co., 1925), I, 38.
01-C3709  12/14/05  2:41 PM  Page 156
writes that Joan’s military genius is entirely natural—“born in
her,” we are assured—and she fights with “an intuition which
could not err.” In battle she is relentless: “it is storm! storm!
storm! and still storm! storm! storm! and forever storm! storm!
storm! hunt the enemy to his hole, then turn her French hur-
ricanes loose and carry him by storm!”48 And yet at the core 
of Joan’s fierce martial instinct is unblemished innocence 
and simplicity. She is “that wonderful child”; she is “perfectly
frank and childlike”; she engages others in a manner that is
“fresh and free, sincere and honest, and unmarred by timorous
self-watching and constraint” (Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc,
pp. 461, 123).
Odd as it may seem, Mark Twain’s Satan is cut from some of
the same cloth as the heroic American general and the warlike
French maid. Speaking of creatures of his divine make, Satan
declares: “We cannot do wrong; neither have we any disposition
to do it, for we do not know what it is” (“Chronicle of Young Sa-
tan,” p. 49). His military might and moral innocence are simul-
taneously on display when he effortlessly destroys a castle and its
five hundred occupants, an exploit that the narrator says leaves
Satan “full of bubbling spirits, and as gay as if this were a wed-
ding instead of a fiendish massacre” (“Chronicle of Young Sa-
tan,” p. 52). In another fragment from the Mysterious Stranger
manuscripts, Twain describes Satan as noble and aristocratic in
all things: charming, resourceful, radiant with health and vigor,
self-confident, and “surpassingly handsome—handsome be-
yond imagination!”49 But above all else, Satan’s radical inno-
cence exempts him from the sway of conventional morality,
thereby freeing him to follow his instincts beyond good and evil,
wherever they may lead. In No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger Satan
proudly insists: “We have no morals; the angels have none;
morals are for the impure; we have no principles, those chains
are for men. . . . We wear no chains, we cannot abide them; we
have no home, no prison, the universe is our province; we do
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not know time, we do not know space—we live, and love, and
labor, and enjoy, fifty years in an hour, while you are sleeping”
(No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger, p. 370).
The potent innocence shared by Grant, Joan, and Satan is
uncommon by any standard, not least of all perhaps because
none of the three is distinguished by what we may think of as
intellectual virtue. None of them is at all thoughtful or reflec-
tive; none displays the slightest tendency toward ratiocination.
This is of course because they are actors, not thinkers; so com-
prehensive is their innocence, their transcendence of all con-
siderations of good and evil, that they are free—as animals are
free— of the necessity to engage in moral reflection. Thus with
them there is no gap between thought and deed, between in-
stinctive impulse and action. This divorce of rational delibera-
tion from true moral freedom is for Nietzsche and Twain the
manifestation of a more general distrust of the human intel-
lect. For both writers conscious thought is not only in thrall to
the tyranny of deceit and self-deception at large in modern civ-
ilization, but also in league with it. The mind is home not to a
mechanically precise Enlightenment calculator, but rather to a
ragged throng of competing impulses, most of them weak,
selfish, and prone to all manner of deceit and self-deception.
Behaving thoughtfully was for our paired writers the furthest
thing from behaving naturally or truthfully or well. Nietzsche
declares:
The development of consciousness, the “spirit,” is for us nothing
less than the symptom of the relative imperfection of the organ-
ism; it means trying, groping, blundering—an exertion which
uses up an unnecessary amount of nervous energy. We deny 
that anything can be done perfectly as long as it is still done con-
sciously. (The Antichrist, p. 581)
The historical emergence of human reflective power was simul-
taneous, in the philosopher’s view, with the onset of bad con-
science and ressentiment, when, for the first time, members of
the species “were forced to think, deduce, calculate, weigh
cause and effect—unhappy people, reduced to their weakest,
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most fallible organ, their consciousness!” (Genealogy of Morals,
p. 217).
We need look no further than Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn to find answering sentiments in the work of Mark Twain.
Huck is morally and emotionally on firm ground so long as he
yields to the promptings of his heart. Almost invariably, how-
ever, when he pauses to reflect on his relationship with Jim,
Huck’s instinctive sense of justice is clouded by the encroach-
ing racial perversities of his culture. At such moments the in-
nocent, unreflecting child is overtaken by the corrupting con-
sciousness of an adult. “Can a beast do wrong?” Twain asks in
an unpublished fragment for What Is Man? Comes the reply:
“No; for it is without consciousness.”50 In another fragment 
he observes: “Morally and in all other details but one—intel-
lect—man is away below the other animals. God does not value
intellect.”51
The shared suspicion of human consciousness, like so
many kindred points of comparison between Nietzsche and
Twain, is widely on display—sometimes directly, sometimes
more obliquely—in the work of both writers. It is precisely be-
cause the “evidence” is so widely broadcast that our survey of
the striking similarities between the philosopher and the hu-
morist has been rather dispersed and piecemeal: narrower,
more detailed attention to individual works would have failed
to suggest the true latitude of common ground. We hasten to
add, however, that it is possible to examine many of the key
correspondences between Nietzsche and Twain in a few, well-
selected writings. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s case, one book, The Ge-
nealogy of Morals—a seminal work on knowledge, morality, con-
science, ressentiment, and human nature generally—will serve
very well as a basis for comparative study. On Twain’s side, the
most relevant works are the late What Is Man?, a Socratic dia-
logue on human nature, and No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger, an
unfinished philosophical novel. “The Facts Concerning the 
Recent Carnival of Crime in Connecticut,” the essays on lying,
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and such social writings as “Corn-Pone Opinions,” “The United
States of Lyncherdom” (1901), and “To the Person Sitting 
in Darkness” (1901) are also germane, as they speak to the 
discontents of modern civilization. Among Mark Twain’s 
major fictions, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and The Tragedy of
Pudd’nhead Wilson are of undoubted interest, though none 
perhaps is more Nietzschean in its social and psychological
analysis than The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876), a novel that
dramatizes the complex interplay between childhood inno-
cence and adult “bad faith” in everyday life on the American
frontier.
The hero of the story, young Tom, is a gifted leader who
succeeds where most adults fail because of his intuitive, unself-
conscious mastery and manipulation of the psychological
forces—fear, envy, and bad conscience prominent among
them—at large beneath the surface of life in his community.
Tom, who lies without guilt, rushes headlong into imagined
battles without fear, and triumphs over Injun Joe, the embod-
ied village nightmare, enjoys youthful immunity to the moral
malaise that afflicts his neighbors. In his intuitive social com-
mand, heroic sang-froid, and unshakable self-confidence, Tom
is a boyish exemplar of the Nietzschean master morality. He is a
“born leader” who never doubts his right or his ability to take
charge, and who never fails. He succeeds because he follows his
instincts and heeds the rules only when it is convenient to do
so. “He would be President, yet,” his neighbors predict, “if he
escaped hanging.”52
Tom’s principal adversary, his half-brother, Sid, is even
more clearly at home in the Nietzschean moral universe. Sid is
a quiet boy; he is socially inept, but secretly ambitious for dis-
tinction. It follows almost inevitably that he is bitterly jealous of
his handsome, outgoing, extravagantly resourceful sibling, who
achieves without apparent effort all that Sid craves but can
never call his own. Sid is driven by the compulsive resistance to
an envied “other” that Nietzsche describes as the defining 
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characteristic of “slave ethics.” True to type, Sid is utterly, per-
versely dependent on Tom; his only action is reaction to what
he hates. He spies on Tom and “tattles” to their Aunt Polly; 
he is a resolute kill-joy, and contrives whenever possible to sub-
vert his rival’s grand schemes; he lies awake at night listening
for damaging revelations in his sleeping half-brother’s dis-
jointed mutterings. He is a consummate embodiment in litera-
ture of ressentiment, the hallmark feature of Nietzsche’s moral
psychology. Indeed, nothing in The Adventures of Tom Sawyer de-
scribes Sid nearly so well as these words from Nietzsche’s The
Genealogy of Morals: “His soul squints; his mind loves hide-outs,
secret paths, and back doors; everything that is hidden seems
to him his own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in
silence, in long memory, [and] in waiting” (Genealogy of Morals,
p. 172).
As their lives wore on, Nietzsche and Twain
grew increasingly emphatic in their dissent from the reigning
optimism about progress and civilization. Both lost their faith
in language and truth and the stability of human identity, and
both, in turn, paid a heavy price for their defiance of the com-
forting certitudes shared by the majority gathered along the
cultural mainstream. Their writings became more edgy and
private, even obscure; much went unpublished. Their interior
lives were equally unsettled: both suffered alienation from fam-
ily and friends; both endured isolation and loneliness; both
knew something of madness; and both craved oblivion. We are
moved by the spectacle of such misery to fantasize a meeting
between these aging twins of genius. We like to imagine that
they would have been quick to identify each other as kindred
spirits, and that understanding and warm trust would have is-
sued from their genial shock of recognition. A happy fiction! In
fact, of course, for Nietzsche as for Twain, the only real relief
for what ailed them lay on the other side of the grave.
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abstract
Gabriel Noah Brahm and Forrest G. Robinson, “The Jester and the
Sage: Twain and Nietzsche” (pp. 137–162)
Though Mark Twain and Friedrich Nietzsche were aware of each other, they never met
and there is no evidence of influence in either direction. Yet the similarities in their
thought are strikingly numerous and close. They were both penetrating psychologists
who shared Sigmund Freud’s interest in the unconscious and his misgiving about the
future of civilization. Both regarded Christianity as a leading symptom of the world’s
madness, manifest in a slavish morality of good and evil and in a widespread subjection
to irrational guilt. They were at one in lamenting the pervasive human surrender to va-
rieties of evasion, disavowal, deceit, and self-deception. Other, lesser similarities
abound in thought, style, and patterns of literary production.
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